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Prospects for Analogue Confirmation 
 
Abstract: In analogical reasoning, observations about one or more source domains provide 
support for a conjecture about a target domain. Analogical support can range from plausibility 
to strong confirmation. In modeling this type of reasoning, two recent discussions are relevant. 
The first is Norton’s challenge to formal models of analogical inference (Norton 2021). The 
second, a debate about whether analogue experiments can confirm theories about an 
inaccessible target domain, provides impetus to develop just such formal models (Dardashti et 
al. 2019). This paper argues that we can navigate these discussions with quasi-formal models 
of analogical reasoning. Such models are broadly compatible with Norton’s position. They 
help to clarify the structure and strength of different forms of analogical inference, and to 




 In analogical reasoning, observations about one or more source domains provide 
inductive support for a hypothesis about a target domain. This support can come in different 
strengths. Work by Froude in the 1800s showed that tests conducted on model ships (the 
source) can provide highly reliable information about the stability of full-size vessels (the 
target) (Froude 1874; Sterrett 2017a). By contrast, many analogical arguments are offered 
2 
 
merely to show that a hypothesis is plausible, i.e., a serious possibility. An ethnographic 
analogy appeals to our knowledge of an object produced by a familiar culture to motivate a 
potential explanation for a similar artefact from a vanished culture. Finally, there are 
analogical arguments of intermediate strength. Neuroscientists interested in the genetic 
mechanisms that lead to neurodegenerative disorders in humans employ animal models, 
typically mice, to support or refine hypotheses about how these diseases may be caused or 
treated in humans (Ahmad-Annuar et al. 2003; Fisher et al. 2019).  
 These examples correspond to a familiar distinction among three grades of inductive 
support. In Bayesian terms, where E represents a new observation and H represents a 
hypothesis, strong confirmation corresponds to Pr(H / E) > r for some threshold r; 
incremental confirmation corresponds to Pr(H / E) > Pr(H); and plausibility may be 
interpreted as non-negligible prior probability Pr(H). The examples suggest a corresponding 
distinction for analogies: strong and intermediate analogue confirmation, and analogical 
plausibility.  
The purpose of this article is to develop a general framework for evaluating whether an 
analogical argument provides strong, weak or intermediate inductive support. In modeling 
analogical reasoning, two current discussions are relevant. The first is Norton’s challenge to 
formal models of analogical reasoning. The second, a debate about analogical inferences with 
inaccessible target domains, provides impetus for developing just such formal models.  
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For Norton (2021), a formal model of analogical reasoning is an abstract, universal 
schema that sets normative standards. The main thesis of his material theory of induction is 
that inductive inferences are warranted entirely by “local” material facts. Inductive schemas, 
to the extent that they are valid, derive their legitimacy from these local facts (2021, 270). In 
the case of analogical reasoning, Norton rejects formal schemas altogether. We should focus 
not on abstract rules but rather on empirical investigation of the source and target domains. In 
a similar spirit, Currie writes that a formal approach can “obscure the local warrants” of 
analogical inferences and “misses where the action is” (2018, 197). I agree with Norton and 
Currie that local facts do the heavy lifting in assessing analogical arguments. I argue, 
however, that an orientation towards local warrant leaves room for what I shall call quasi-
formal models, and that they are broadly compatible with Norton’s position.  
Now consider the problem of analogies whose target domains are, in crucial respects, 
inaccessible to observation. Some physicists and philosophers believe that experiments on 
black hole analogues can confirm the existence of Hawking radiation in real black holes 
(Dardashti et al. 2017, 2019). The target domain is inaccessible because actual black holes, in 
relevant respects, are astronomically remote. Hawking radiation cannot be detected from 
earth. A second prominent group of examples comes from historical sciences, such as 
archaeology and evolutionary biology, where scientists use analogies to make inferences 




The important question, when the target is inaccessible, is whether an analogical 
inference can provide intermediate (incremental) confirmation. There is no consensus on 
whether the analogue gravity experiments confirm the existence of Hawking radiation.1 There 
are both optimists and pessimists on analogue confirmation in archaeology.2 The material 
theory of analogy seems to have little to offer in resolving such debates. If the target domain is 
inaccessible, then empirical investigation, almost by definition, cannot settle disagreements 
about whether an analogical argument provides confirmation or just plausibility. This 
motivates us to reconsider formal approaches to analogical inference, and indeed (Dardashti et 
al. 2019) develop a Bayesian approach. 
I shall steer a middle course through these debates by arguing for the value of quasi-
formal models of analogical reasoning. The starting point is the thesis that good analogical 
arguments are related to background generalizations or uniformities, but in different ways.3 
Strong analogical arguments are “powered” by an underlying generalization that establishes a 
reliable correlation between features of the source and target domains. Weak analogical 
arguments proceed in the opposite direction: they aim at a potential generalization. Finally, 
intermediate analogical arguments rely on the refinement of partially articulated 
generalizations that generate inter-domain correlations of intermediate strength. In all three 
cases, the “action” is local, but quasi-formal models let us distinguish between the three types 
                                                 
1 Crowther et al (2019), in particular, reject claims of confirmation.  
2 (Chapman and Wylie 2016) review decades-long debates about analogies in archaeology. 
3 This idea, which builds on (Bartha 2010), is challenged by Fraser (this symposium). 
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by spelling out the role played by background generalizations. The models incorporate 
standards that are helpful in assessing the prospects for analogue confirmation, even for 
inaccessible (or partially inaccessible) target domains. 
Section 2 of the paper discusses Norton’s material theory. Section 3 provides examples 
of quasi-formal models for strong and weak analogical arguments. Section 4 argues for the 
value of similar models for intermediate analogue confirmation. Section 5 explores the 
Bayesian framework in Dardashti et al. (2019), and assesses its potential application to 
inaccessible target domains.  
2. Norton’s material theory of analogy 
Norton argues negatively that formal analyses of analogical reasoning are pointless, 
and positively for an analysis in which analogical inferences are warranted entirely on the 
basis of local facts.4 The essence of the negative argument is that any abstract formal schema 
for analogy will “at best fit a range of cases imperfectly” (Norton 2021, 105). Even elaborate 
schema “will still never be adequate to all the cases. Gaps will remain.” There is “no universal 
schema” which tells us when properties of the source can legitimately be passed to the target. 
On Norton’s positive account, analogies are “factual matters to be explored 
empirically” (2021, 96). A good analogical inference is “powered” by some material fact that 
embraces the two systems, which Norton calls the fact of analogy. In a successful analogical 
argument, the fact of analogy, together with additional observations about one or both 
                                                 
4 This section draws on the assessment of Norton’s theory of analogy in (Bartha 2020). 
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systems, warrants the conclusion. Norton argues that this analysis matches scientific practice. 
Analogical reasoning in science is oriented towards “empirical investigations” of the facts, 
rather than useless formal principles (2021, 106).  
As an illustration, Norton considers Galileo’s use of analogy to infer the existence of 
mountains on the moon. In Siderius Nuncius (1610), Galileo records his observation of the 
advancing edge of sunlight on the moon. Bright points of light appear ahead of the boundary, 
and eventually join up with the illuminated area. Galileo compares this to what happens at 
sunrise on earth, when the “highest peaks [are] illuminated by the sun’s rays while the plains 
below remain in shadow” (1610, 33). He infers that the points of light mark the location of 
mountains on the moon. On Norton’s reading, Galileo’s inference is not warranted by 
conformity to some formal rule. Rather, the warrant is this: “the mode of creation of shadows 
on the earth and of the moving dark patterns on the moon is the same: they are shadows 
formed by straight rays of sunlight” (2021, 108). Norton adds: “the inference is not driven as 
much by analogy as by subsumption of the moon into a larger class of illuminated bodies” 
(2021, 109). 
In this example, the “fact of analogy” is best understood as a background 
generalization sufficiently broad that it applies to both domains.5 This generalization, together 
with additional facts about the two domains, provides both formal and material warrant for the 
                                                 
5 This reading of Norton is defended in (Bartha 2020). 
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analogical inference, and eliminates the need for any universal schema.  We can, however, 
characterize Galileo’s argument in formal terms, using the following pattern:  
S (Earth)      T (Moon) 
   (x)(P(x) → Q(x))         1 
P(S): points of light/shadows    P(T) →Q(T) 
Q(S): mountains     P(T) 
       ↓2 
       Q(T) 
   Fig. 1: Mountains on the moon 
The local generalization is that patterns of light and shadow on illuminated bodies are always 
produced by rays of sunlight striking regions of different elevation. This generalization 
derives support both from terrestrial observations and from general theory (optics). The two 
arrows represent deductive inferences from the generalization, together with the observation 
P(T) of the points of light on the moon. We could invoke a broader generalization (the laws of 
optics), but the overall reasoning pattern would be similar.6  
 Quasi-formal models are compatible with Norton’s rejection of universal schemas. 
They are templates that indicate how an analogical inference relates to particular facts and to 
                                                 
6Norton notes that there is an element of inductive risk in the conclusion. We could represent the argument form 
as abductive (see section 3.2). In short, different quasi-formal models might be applied, each specifying a 
different “formal basis” for the argument.  
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the background generalization (fact of analogy). Norton insists that the fact of analogy always 
“powers” the argument. This position limits the material theory to models of strong analogue 
confirmation (section 3.1). Other types of analogical inference require different models.  
3. Strong and weak analogical arguments 
Predictive analogical arguments use analogies to predict specific properties of the target 
domain. Explanatory analogical arguments use analogies to support an explanatory hypothesis 
about the target domain, one that would explain the observed features. I argue in this section 
that this distinction about objectives aligns with a distinction in logical structure between 
strong and weak analogical arguments. In strong analogical arguments, a well-supported 
background uniformity powers the inference. In weak arguments, the background uniformity 
may not be articulated and the direction of inference is reversed. The structural distinction 
leads to different models, and different standards, for the two categories. 
3.1 Strong analogue confirmation and predictive analogies 
 Experiments and observations on a source domain sometimes lead to highly reliable 
predictions about the target domain. This type of analogical reasoning, important in practical 
settings, draws upon empirical observation and theoretical understanding of both domains.  
Sterrett (2017a, 2017b) provides historical and philosophical examination of the 
method of physically similar systems. One of the examples that she discusses is the work of 
William Froude, a 19th century English engineer, on model ships. Prior to Froude, model ships 
were used in the design of full-size vessels, but predictions were unreliable. Froude 
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where v represents ship speed, l is the characteristic length of the hull and g is the gravitational 
constant. A model ship with the same Froude number as a full-sized vessel could be used to 
predict, for the full-sized ship, the residual resistance of the water due to created waves and 
eddies. Froude’s Law of Comparisons states that if S and T are ships with the same Froude 






  3 . 
Froude’s results allowed for “the estimation, with reasonable accuracy, of the resistance and 
horse-power of full-sized ships from experiments with small and inexpensive models” (Taylor 
1907, 418).7 
 Efforts to analyze the reasoning in this and similar examples culminated in two papers 
by Edgar Buckingham (1914a, 1914b). Buckingham begins with a standard characterization of 
two physically similar systems S and S′:  
                                                 
7Taylor mentions a number of constraints for such inferences. 
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If the relation in S′ is of the same form as the relation in S and is describable by the 
same equation, then the two systems are physically similar as regards this relation. 
(1914b, 353) 
In many cases, we don’t need to know the underlying physical laws. It is enough to know that 
certain dimensionless quantities determine the feature of interest, and that these dimensionless 
quantities are identical in the two systems. (The Froude number is one such dimensionless 
quantity.) Buckingham writes Π1, …, Πp for the dimensionless parameters and Ψ(Π1, …, Πp) 
= 0 for the reduced equation that indicates the dependence relations. He states: 
If the values of the dimensionless parameters… are the same for S and S′, then we can 
determine the values of any [physical variable] Qi in S′ given the others, and given 
values of Qi in S. (1914a) 
This gives us a quasi-formal model for analogical reasoning, described in (Sterrett 2017b): 
  S (source)      T (target) 
     Ψ(Π1, …, Πp) = 0 
 
  Π1 = π       Π1 = π1  
  Q(S)       Q(T)  
Fig. 2: Common reduced equation 
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The template in Fig. 2 is quasi-formal because it has the kind of “gaps” that Norton notes. 
Correct application requires expertise about the range of applicability for the reduced 
equation. The template is nevertheless useful because it illustrates the basic structure and 
requirements of strong analogue confirmation: 
• A well-confirmed local generalization that lets us move reliably between features of the 
source and target domains; 
• Typically, a predictive analogical inference: the inferred conclusion, Q(T), is a particular 
property of the target. 
3.2 Weak analogical arguments 
Analogical reasoning is often used to show that a conjecture is plausible, i.e., worthy of 
serious consideration. Bartha (2010) proposes that such arguments are successful if they 
establish the potential truth of a generalization that covers both source and target domains. 
Bartha’s articulation model is based on a two-step evaluation. The first step is to articulate the 
prior association, a causal or logical relationship among the properties of the source domain. 
The second step is to assess the potential for generalization by verifying that no crucial 
element of the prior association lacks an analogue in the target domain.  
As an illustration, consider the acoustical analogy, employed by some 19th century 
physicists seeking to explain the discrete lines in the visible spectrum of Hydrogen.8 Around 
                                                 
8 This example expands on the discussion in (Bartha 2010). For a historical account, see (Maier 1981). 
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1870, Stokes suggested that the lines might be explained using a model analogous to a 
vibrating string or tuning fork. If such a model were correct, then we could identify the 
frequencies with some type of oscillation. We should expect to find that frequencies fn of the 
spectral lines are integral multiples of a fundamental frequency f1, and therefore that the 
frequencies should be related by simple whole-number ratios. Although Stoney (in 1871) 
found that some of the frequencies could be related in this way, there were many missing 
spectral lines. Furthermore, the whole-number ratios that he discovered involved the numbers 
20, 27 and 32 – hardly simple ratios. As Bartha (2010) suggests, the acoustical analogy has an 
initial measure of plausibility but, on close scrutiny, fails to satisfy the criterion of potential 
for generalization.  
Consider the structural difference between the acoustical analogy and analogical 
inference using model ships. In the latter case, the background generalization, Froude’s Law, 
is well understood in advance and drives the analogical reasoning. In the acoustical analogy, 
the analogical inference is powered in the reverse direction: from observed features of the two 
domains (the discrete frequencies) towards a possible generalization that is not fully 
articulated. This is an explanatory analogical inference: its purpose is to suggest the kind of 
hypothesis that might explain the spectral lines of hydrogen. We can represent the inference 
with the following diagram: 
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S (vibrating string)     T (hydrogen spectral lines) 
    [General harmonic oscillator model] 
     
  
 Q:  fn = n f1 for n = 1,2,…    Q*:  fn = n f1 for n = 1,2,…  
E: fn / fm = n/m     E*: ? fn / fm = n/m  
           
    Fig. 3: Acoustical analogy 
Q represents an explanatory feature of the source whose analogue is projected to hold for the 
target. The positive analogy, E and E*, is the observed evidence of discrete frequencies in 
whole number ratios. The dashed arrows point towards a tentative background generalization. 
The argument fails for lack of evidence that spectral line frequencies fn occur in the right 
ratios. The logic is captured in the quasi-formal model of Fig. 3.  
Weak analogical arguments derive their cogency from the possibility of a background 
generalization. Quasi-formal models indicate the structure of this relationship, which supplies 
the material and formal foundation for the argument.  
4. Intermediate analogical arguments 
A positive result for medical treatment tested on an animal model may count as evidence 
(incremental confirmation) for its effectiveness in humans. Currie (2018) seems to 
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acknowledge a similar function for analogies in the historical sciences. He identifies a role for 
background uniformities in such arguments:  
One does not move from analogue-features to the target having features without 
mediation. The mediation in historical science is often via some process type that is 
taken to have been active in both analogue and target… (2018, 197) 
This diverges from the models in section 3. We must have prior knowledge of a background 
uniformity over the two domains (in contrast to plausibility arguments), but this may be a 
broad uniformity (in contrast to strong analogical arguments). Particular facts about the 
domains are then used to refine the uniformity. Intermediate analogue confirmation, therefore, 
is “powered” in both directions. This section outlines two models. 
4.1 Analogical reasoning used to refine a broad regularity 
 Donnan (1971) uses ethnographic analogy to explain the significance of odd markings 
on the necks of Moche clay pots found in the Peruvian Andes (Donnan 1971). Donnan learned 
that contemporary Peruvian potters in the region employ similar markings, known as signáles, 
to indicate ownership when multiple potters fire their pots in a common kiln. The analogical 
reasoning appears to confirm that the marks served the same purpose for the Moche. The 
conclusion is strengthened by direct historical analogy: the present-day population traces a 
continuous link to the Moche culture. 
 The pattern of inference may be represented as follows: 
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 Q    X    Q*  
     X’ 
P        P*   
   Fig. 4: Refinement of a broad regularity 
P and P* denote the positive analogy: analogous effects (signáles). Q denotes the known 
explanation for current production practices, and Q* denotes the analogous explanation for the 
Mochica. X represents a broad background uniformity: production processes operate in the 
same way in both domains. X is refined to a more specific uniformity, X′: “ceramic 
technologies… are maintained over long periods of time” (Donnan 1971, 466). The refined 
uniformity supports the analogical conclusion, Q*.  
 It might seem that this explanatory analogy provides incremental confirmation. 
Interestingly, Donnan makes no such claim, contenting himself with a modest assertion of 
plausibility:  
The ethnographic analogy does offer a possible explanation for the marks… and 
provides an interesting hypothesis which could be tested when more data are made 
available (1971, 466).  
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Whether this sort of analogical argument counts as confirmation appears to depend upon our 
ability to exclude rival explanatory hypotheses. This difficulty is specific to explanatory 
analogies, which reinforces the idea that they are naturally classified as plausibility arguments.  
4.2 Engineering the right source domain 
 Researchers studying neurodegenerative diseases rely on animal models, typically 
mice or rats, to understand how the diseases work in humans. Consider SMA, Spinal Muscular 
Atrophy, a disease caused by defective motor neurons. Humans have one copy of the SMN1 
(survival motor neuron 1) gene and up to four copies of SMN2, a “backup” gene that 
imperfectly duplicates the protein-producing function of SMN1. Mutations in SMN1 result in 
SMA, a disease in which motor neurons in the brain stem and spinal cord gradually die. The 
death rate is inversely related to the amount of functional SMN2.  
 Mice are used to study SMA, but the genetic mechanism in mice is different. Mice 
have a single SMN gene (Fig. 5, from (Fisher and Bannerman 2019)). If one or both alleles 
are normal, the mouse is viable and does not develop SMA; if both alleles are mutated, the 
mouse dies in embryo. Consequently, SMA never occurs in naturally born mice.  
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Fig. 5: SMN genes in mice and humans 
For this reason, engineered mouse models are used. One SMN allele is deleted and the other is 
modified to resemble various mutations of human SMN2. The mouse is viable and develops 
SMA. Researchers can study the rate of neuron loss in relation to the amount of functional 
SMN2, and they can test gene therapies. This research has had considerable success in 
developing treatments for humans. 
 Do the experiments on mice provide incremental confirmation for hypotheses about 
neurodegenerative diseases in humans? Arguably, yes. The argument begins with a broad 
background uniformity, in this case our common genetic inheritance:  
99% of human genes have a mouse homolog and more than 90% of the genes that 
have been implicated in human disease are present in the mouse genome” (Ahmad-
Annuar et al 2003, 451).  
This provides a basis for using the animal model in plausibility arguments, aimed at exploring 
possible genetic mechanisms for a disease. In the case of SMA, where the causal gene is 
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known, researchers adopt a more precise approach in which the gene is mutated to create the 
mouse model. Researchers can then rely on a specific uniformity to explore causal 
mechanisms and develop treatments. These predictive analogical arguments are good 
candidates for incremental confirmation.  
In short: intermediate analogue confirmation seems to require an independently 
established background generalization which is refined using particular facts about the two 
domains. The prospects for incremental analogue confirmation are better for predictive 
analogies than for explanatory analogies.  
5. Bayesian analysis of analogue confirmation; application to inaccessible domains 
Dardashti et al. (2019), henceforth (DHTW 2019), propose a Bayesian analysis of 
intermediate analogue confirmation. This section briefly explains their Bayesian model (in a 
simplified fashion) and explores its applicability to black holes and other inaccessible target 
domains. 
In an earlier paper (Dardashti et al. 2017), the authors argue that analogue confirmation of 
a hypothesis about an inaccessible target domain rests on an assumption of universality. Two 
systems belong to the same universality class if variation in physical type is irrelevant to the 
physical properties of interest. The assumption that source and target belong to the same 
universality class is appropriate for physically similar systems (section 3.1). More generally, 
the requirement of universality is similar to the requirement, in section 4, of an independently 
established background generalization for incremental confirmation. In the examples of 
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section 4, however, justification comes from observation of both source and target domains. If 
the target is inaccessible, the authors suggest, “model-external and empirically grounded 
arguments”, or MEEGA, might still be given for universality (2017, 73).  
In the black hole example, the challenge is to justify the assumption, call it X, that 
laboratory analogues of black holes belong to the same universality class as actual black holes. 
Given X, the observation of phenomena analogous to Hawking radiation in the analogue 
experiments can provide incremental confirmation for Hawking radiation in actual black 
holes. But it is unclear exactly how X is to be justified.  
The Bayesian analysis of (DHTW 2019) offers two improvements. First, it provides a 
general model for incremental analogue confirmation. Second, it replaces the assumption of 
universality (X) with the seemingly weaker assumption 0 < Pr(X) < 1: universality has non-
zero prior probability. Let A represent the source domain and M the target. The Bayesian 
model introduces four binary variables: 
X: Universality assumptions hold. 
M: The model of the target is adequate. 
A: The model of the source is adequate. 















Fig. 6: Bayesian representation of analogue confirmation 
The argument for confirmation rests on the following assumptions: 
(1) The relationship between X, M, A, E is appropriately modeled with the Bayesian 
network in Fig. 6. 
(2) 1 > Pr(X) > 0 
(3) Pr(M / X) > Pr(M / ¬X): Universality supports M. 
(4) Pr(A / X) > Pr(A / ¬X): Universality supports A. 
(5) Pr(E / A) > Pr(E / ¬A): E is supported by A. 
From these assumptions, one can prove 






After arguing that conditions (1) – (5) are satisfied for the black hole example, the authors 
conclude that observation of phenomena analogous to Hawking radiation in the laboratory 
analogues would incrementally confirm the reality of Hawking radiation.   
 The Bayesian analysis provides a useful model for incremental analogue confirmation. 
There is an important concern, however, about whether the argument gains in generality by 
substituting the assumption 0 < Pr(X) < 1 in place of X.  
Consider the following simple experiment. A coin of unknown bias is tossed. If Heads 
comes up, a coin biased in favour of Heads is placed in each of two boxes, labelled M and A. 
If Tails comes up, coins biased in favour of Tails are placed in the two boxes. Box M is 
removed from the room; it is now unobservable. Box A is opened, the coin inside is tossed 
and the result is Heads. This evidence provides incremental confirmation that the coin in box 
M is biased for Heads. To see that this experiment conforms to assumptions (1) – (5), let X 
signify Heads on the original toss, let M and A signify the placement of a coin biased for 
Heads in the two boxes, and let E stand for a result of Heads when the coin in box A is tossed. 
Because (1)– (5) are satisfied, we have analogue confirmation: Pr(M / E) > Pr(M). But the 
assumptions guarantee the existence of a correlation between the variables M and A: 
Pr(M / A) > Pr(M) and Pr(M / ¬A) < Pr(M) regardless of the value of Pr(X), so long as 
0 < Pr(X) < 1. The relevant universality assumption here is not X but an experimental set-up 
that guarantees that both coins have the same bias.  
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 Similarly, in the black hole example, the universality assumption responsible for 
incremental confirmation is not X, but the Bayesian network set-up that guarantees a 
correlation between M and A. The universality assumption is no weaker than in the (2017) 
paper. We face the same difficulty: to understand how MEEGA can justify a universality 
assumption for an entirely inaccessible target domain. Perhaps this concern is similar to the 
one expressed by Crowther et al (2019), who insist that analogue confirmation depends on 
prior confirmation that source and target belong to a common universality class. 
6. Conclusion 
I close with two optimistic comments about analogue confirmation. First: there are ways 
of establishing the universality assumption in cases of partially inaccessible targets (as we saw 
in the SMA example), and perhaps we can do the same for black holes, based on general 
theoretical considerations or accessible knowledge of black holes. Second: the distinction 
between confirmation and plausibility arguments is not always critical. Plausibility arguments 
count towards overall probability and, in a Bayesian framework, they are part of the logic of 
confirmation. Furthermore, as Reiss (2019) suggests, there is much to be said for broadening 
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